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Behavioral/Cognitive
Contributions of the Ventral Striatum to Conscious
Perception: An Intracranial EEG Study of the Attentional
Blink
XHeleen A. Slagter,1,2 XAli Mazaheri,3 XLeon C. Reteig,1 Ruud Smolders,4 XMartijn Figee,4Mariska Mantione,4
P. Richard Schuurman,5 and XDamiaan Denys4,6
1Department of Psychology and 2Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WS Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 3School of
Psychology, University of Birmingham, B15 2TT Birmingham, United Kingdom, 4Department of Psychiatry, Academic Medical Center, 1105 AZ
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 5Department of Neurosurgery, Academic Medical Center, 1105 AZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and 6The Netherlands
Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science, 1105 BA Amsterdam, The Netherlands
The brain is limited in its capacity to consciously process information, necessitating gating of information. While conscious perception
is robustly associated with sustained, recurrent interactions between widespread cortical regions, subcortical regions, including the
striatum, influence cortical activity. Here, we examined whether the ventral striatum, given its ability to modulate cortical information
flow, contributes to conscious perception. Using intracranial EEG, we recorded ventral striatum activity while 7 patients performed an
attentional blink task in which they had to detect two targets (T1 and T2) in a stream of distractors. Typically, when T2 follows T1 within
100–500ms, it is often not perceived (i.e., the attentional blink). We found that conscious T2 perception was influenced and signaled by
ventral striatal activity. Specifically, the failure to perceive T2 was foreshadowed by a T1-induced increase in  and low  oscillatory
activity as early as 80 ms after T1, indicating that the attentional blink to T2 may be due to very early T1-driven attentional capture.
Moreover, only consciously perceived targets were associated with an increase in  activity between 200 and 400 ms. These unique
findings shed new light on the mechanisms that give rise to the attentional blink by revealing that conscious target perception may be
determined by T1 processing at a much earlier processing stage than traditionally believed. More generally, they indicate that ventral
striatum activity may contribute to conscious perception, presumably by gating cortical information flow.
Key words: attentional blink; consciousness; intracranial EEG; oscillations; perception; striatum
Introduction
A fundamental question in the study of conscious perception
relates to the neural basis of conscious access: what brain mech-
anisms determine whether a stimulus becomes available for ex-
plicit report? Research shows that only consciously perceived
stimuli are associated with sustained, synchronized activity
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Significance Statement
What determines whether we become aware of a piece of information or not? Conscious access has been robustly associated with
activity within a distributed network of cortical regions. Using intracranial electrophysiological recordings during an attentional
blink task, we tested the idea that the ventral striatum, because of its ability tomodulate cortical information flow,may contribute
to conscious perception. We find that conscious perception is influenced and signaled by ventral striatal activity. Short-latency
(80–140ms) striatal responses to a first target determined conscious perception of a second target. Moreover, conscious percep-
tion of the second target was signaled by longer-latency (200–400 ms) striatal activity. These results suggest that the ventral
striatummay be part of a subcortical network that influences conscious experience.
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within a distributed network of cortical
regions (Rees et al., 2002; Haynes, 2009;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Lau and
Rosenthal, 2011; Aru et al., 2012; van Gaal
and Lamme, 2012). Based on this work,
influential theories propose that con-
scious access stems froma cognitive archi-
tecture with an evolved function: the
flexible sharing of information through-
out the cortex (Baars, 1993; Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001). Yet, the cortex operates
in close interaction with subcortical re-
gions, specifically the thalamus and the
basal ganglia. The thalamus has rich and
widespread reciprocal connections to the
cortex and thus can synchronize activity
across distant cortical regions. Several
theories propose that this vast thalamo-
cortical architecture may shape the bo-
undary conditions for both the level of
wakefulness (Vijayan and Kopell, 2012;
MacDonald et al., 2015) as well conscious
perception to occur (Newman and Baars,
1993; Crick, 1995; Tononi and Edelman,
1998; Baars, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005). Notably,
thalamocortical interactions are modulated by the basal ganglia,
which tonically inhibit the thalamus and thereby cortical activa-
tion. This raises the possibility that the basal ganglia may also
contribute to conscious perception, through their influence on
activity within the network of frontoparietal regions that gives
rise to conscious experience.
The basal ganglia are connected to many frontal regions in
parallel loops through the thalamus, and hence capable of mod-
ulating a wide range of associated processes. Loops connecting
the basal ganglia to motor cortex have long been implicated in
action selection. Notably, converging evidence indicates that
these parallel loops connecting the basal ganglia and frontal cor-
tex may serve a more generic “selection” function and may re-
solve conflicts not only in the motor domain, but also among
cognitive resources (Redgrave et al., 1999a). Evidence from ani-
mal studies suggests that the striatum can act as an early gating
system that enables the prioritization of salient stimuli by trigger-
ing frontal systems to orient attention (Redgrave and Gurney,
2006; Overton et al., 2014). Moreover, the striatum receives
longer-latency input from the hippocampus, which may provide
longer-duration, context-dependent gating of prefrontal activity
(Newman and Grace, 1999). By gating cortical information flow,
the striatum could hence be part of a subcortical network that
provides a “gateway” to conscious experience, for example, by
biasing attention (van Schouwenburg et al., 2015), and guide
which information is selected for global broadcasting and con-
scious access.
Although the striatum is perfectly situated to influence con-
scious information processing, little is currently known about its
exact contribution to conscious perception. This gap in knowl-
edge is related to our inability to record subcortical activity with
high temporal precision in healthy humans and difficulties in
studying consciousness in animals. Human neuroimaging stud-
ies have provided some support for a role for the striatum and its
irrigation by dopamine in conscious perception (Slagter et al.,
2010, 2012; Van Opstal et al., 2014; Bisenius et al., 2015). For
example, a recent PET study (Slagter et al., 2012) revealed an
association between striatal dopamine D2 receptor binding and
the attentional blink (AB): a deficit in consciously perceiving the
second target of two targets (T1 and T2) whenever it follows T1
within 100–500 ms in a rapid stream of distractors. Yet, these
neuroimaging methods lack temporal precision and provide in-
direct measures of neural activity, leaving the specific contribu-
tion of the striatum to conscious perception unclear.
To shed light on the potential role of the striatum in conscious
perception, we used the unique opportunity to directly record
electrophysiological activity from the ventral striatum in patients
while they performed an AB task (Raymond et al., 1992). This
task has two unique features. First, it has proven useful for study-
ing the neural correlates of conscious perception by comparing
the neural processing of T2 between T2-seen versus T2-unseen
trials. Second, it allows investigation of the conditions that are
necessary for a stimulus to reach awareness by revealing how
neural processing of T1 affects the ability to consciously perceive
T2 (Dux andMarois, 2009;Martens andWyble, 2010). By linking
conscious perception to real-time basal ganglia measurements,
we aimed to elucidate the role of the ventral striatum in conscious
perception.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Eight therapy-resistant patients eligible for deep brain stim-
ulation (DBS) participated in the study. One patient had difficulty seeing
any target, and the experiment had to be aborted prematurely. Of the 7
remaining patients (mean age: 39.5 years; age range: 22–63 years), 6 were
female. Five patients had a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder,
one patient had a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and another
patient had a drug addiction. They participated in the experiment 1 d (1
patient) or 3 d (6 patients) after undergoing DBS lead placement surgery
and before DBS stimulator implantation. All the patients underwent
careful screening before being included for DBS as described by Denys et
al. (2010). Patients were implanted following standard procedures with a
four contact electrode (model 3387 with contact points 1.5 mm long and
separated from adjacent contacts by 1.5 mm; Medtronic) in each hemi-
sphere. The surgical technique has been described previously (Denys et
al., 2010; van denMunckhof et al., 2013). The electrodes were implanted
following the anterior limb of the internal capsule (ALIC), with the deep-
est contact targeted at the core of the nucleus accumbens and the three
upper contacts in the ventral ALIC (Fig. 1). DBS leads were externalized
at the back of the head based on individual anatomy to facilitate the
Figure 1. A, Schematic illustration of deep-brain electrodes in the ventral striatum. Red represents the core of the nucleus
accumbens (NAc). Adaptedwith permission from Figee et al. (2013).B, The AB task. Subjects had to detect two targets (T1 and T2;
two numbers) in a rapid stream of distractor stimuli. Shown is an example of a short T1–T2 interval trial.
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recordings. Correct stereotactic position of the DBS leads was verified
with postoperative stereotactic CT. During the subsequent recordings,
patients received normal medical treatment in addition to antibiotics
and analgesics when requested or deemedmedically necessary. However,
to reduce the risk of brain hemorrhage, any administration of selective
serotonin response inhibitors was suspended. This study was approved
by the Institutional Review Board of the AcademicMedical Center of the
University of Amsterdam.
Task and stimuli. Stimulus presentation was performed using Presen-
tation (version 14.5; Neurobehavioural Systems) and a laptop (Hewlett
Packard 6730b) with a 15.4 inch display at a resolution of 1024  768
pixels (refresh rate of 60 Hz). The distance from the screen to the partic-
ipants was kept at60 cm. Participants performed a standard AB task in
which they had to identify two digits (T1 and T2) presented in a rapid
stream of distractors (letters and symbols) (Fig. 1a). T2 followed T1
either in the timewindow of the AB, after 200ms (short-interval trial), or
outside the time window of the AB, after 800 ms (long-interval trial).
Each trial started with a fixation-plus sign (; 1500 ms), after which the
stimulus stream began, consisting of 22 stimuli. Stimuli were presented
on a gray background (red, green, blue [RGB]: 50, 50, 50) at the center of
the screen (28 point Arial; 0.94 degrees visual angle) for 50 ms, followed
by a 50 ms blank. T1 was either green (RGB: 30, 120, 55) or red (RGB:
140, 80, 125). T2 and the distractors were always blue (RGB: 90, 90, 190).
Stimulus colors were matched in luminance. T1 had a different color to
make the T2 task more difficult. Digits were drawn randomly (without
replacement) from the set 2–9. Distractors were randomly drawn (with-
out replacement) from the following set of 30 letters and symbols: W, E,
R, T, Y, U, P, A, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, Z, X, C, V, B, N,M, @, #, $, %, }, &,,
and. T1 positionwas varied randomly between 7 and 10. The temporal
distance between T1 and T2 could be short (200 ms; 67.5% of trials) or
long (800 ms; 32.5% of trials). At 1500 ms after the stream ended, par-
ticipants were asked to report the two digits by typing the numbers in
order using an external number pad. If they did not see one or both
numbers, they were instructed to guess.
Participants first practiced the task for 15 trials. In the first 8 practice
trials, stimuli were presented at half speed (100 ms duration followed by
a 100ms blank). They then performed either 4 or 6 blocks (depending on
the condition of the patient) of 37 trials each, resulting in 100 or 150
short-interval trials and 48 or 72 long-interval trials, respectively, all
intermixed within blocks.
Participants were instructed to keep their eyes at the center of the
screen (at the fixation cross or at the streamof stimuli) at all times, except
during the question period. Specifically, they were asked to wait with
moving their eyes down to their response hand until the first question
(“what was the first number?”) popped up, to reduce eye movements
from creating artifacts in the EEG signal during target processing. They
were also asked to move their eyes back to the center of the screen while
or right after entering their second answer, so that they looked at the
fixation cross again at the beginning of the next trial. Responses were
unspeeded.
Intracranial EEG (iEEG) recording. While patients performed the AB
task, we recorded iEEG from the implantedDBS electrodes using custom
extension wires for the 64-channel (Advanced Neuro Technology BV)
amplifier. We also recorded both the horizontal and vertical EOG, with
bipolar electrodes placed at the outer canthi of both eyes and above and
below the left eye, respectively. Although scalp EEG was also recorded
using 64 shielded Ag/AgCl electrodes following the international 10/10
system, we did not process these data further because of the poor signal
quality due to the placement of postoperative bandages on the scalp. The
EEG was recorded at 1024 Hz, except for one patient where data were
recorded at 512 Hz.
Behavioral data analysis. To determine the presence of an AB, T2 ac-
curacy in short and long interval trials was compared using a paired t test.
T2 accuracy was based only on those trials in which T1 was correctly
reported.
iEEG data analysis.Offline preprocessing of iEEG data was performed
using the EEGLAB toolbox running inMATLAB (TheMathWorks). The
iEEG at a given contact point was referenced to the local average activity
of all contacts in that hemisphere. Visual inspection revealed that no data
were recorded (flat line) at left contact point 4 for one patient, and at
right contact point 2 for another patient (with contact point 1 being the
most ventral one). Extreme high-frequency noise was visible at right
contact point 2 for a third patient. These contact points in these patients
were thus excluded from data analysis and were also not used for average
referencing. Data were subsequently high-pass filtered at 0.5 Hz to re-
move slow drifts. For each condition of interest, trials were then epoched
in synchrony with T1 onset (2000 to 2500 ms), and trials containing
artifacts (drifts, etc.) or eye blinks on the vertical EOG channel during
target presentation were rejected through visual inspection. This led to
rejection of six trials for one subject. No trials were rejected for the other
subjects. Following previous studies, we focused our analysis on oscilla-
tory activity in the lower frequency range (30 Hz), as well as on the
ventral-most contact points at the core of the nucleus accumbens in each
hemisphere (Cohen et al., 2012; Figee et al., 2013; Smolders et al., 2013),
which appear to lie very close to where we previously observed greater
conscious perception-related activity to consciously perceived compared
with missed T2s with fMRI (Slagter et al., 2010).
Time-frequency analysis.To examine the role of the ventral striatum in
the AB, our primary analysis focused on differences in target-induced
oscillatory activity (or power) between T2-seen (no-blink) and T2-
unseen (blink) trials. Time-frequency representations of power and
phase were calculated for each trial using sliding Hanning tapers with an
adaptive time window of two cycles for each frequency (1–30 Hz in
logarithmically spaced steps). This approach has been used often in pre-
vious studies (e.g., Mazaheri et al., 2009). Time-frequency representa-
tions were computed separately for each condition (blink, no-blink),
interval (short, long), contact point (left, right), and participant, and
baseline corrected using the time window500 to200 ms before T1.
Statistics. Given the relatively small number of patients, we used a
nonparametric permutation procedure used in previous studies to assess
statistical significance of the time-frequency data (Cohen et al., 2009).
For the time-frequency data, we first randomly relabeled T2-unseen and
T2-seen trials and created 1000 permuted difference maps of power.
Next, at each time-frequency point, the true observed difference between
T2-unseen and T2-seen trials was subtracted from the mean permuted
difference and divided by the SD of the permuted differences to obtain a
z value. This z value reflects the standardized distance away from the
distribution of time-frequency power expected by chance. We chose a z
value corresponding to a p value of 0.05 as the threshold for significance
and a cluster size of 25 time-frequency pixels. In case of a significant
effect, post hoc analyses were conducted to determine whether effects
were driven by changes in T2-seen or T2-unseen trials by comparing
mean activity in the significant time-frequency cluster in T2-seen (or
T2-unseen) trials to mean baseline activity in a corresponding frequency
range in T2-seen (or T2-unseen) trials.
Results
Patients displayed a robust AB: theymore often failed to perceive
T2 when it followed T1 after 200 than after 800 ms (Fig. 2; t(6)
4.0, p  0.007). Comparable with previous studies with healthy
adults, T1 accuracy was high (on average, 85%) regardless of the
interval between the two targets (t(6) 0.04, p 0.972).
To examine the role of the ventral striatum in the AB, our
primary analysis focused on the neural differences in target-
induced oscillatory activity (or power) between trials in which T1
andT2were both consciously perceived (T2-seen trials) and trials
in which T1 was seen, but T2 was missed (T2-unseen trials). In
line with a contribution of the ventral striatum to the AB, this
analysis revealed differences in both T1 and T2 processing be-
tween trials in which T2 was seen versus missed (Figs. 3, 4). First,
the AB was foreshadowed by short-latency differences in T1 pro-
cessing between T2-unseen and T2-seen trials. Specifically, the
imminent failure to perceive T2 was signaled by a T1-induced
transient burst of activity in the  and low  range (8–16 Hz)
occurring as early as 80ms after the first target (80–140ms) in the
left ventral striatum (Fig. 3). Only in trials in which T2 was
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missed, did T1 induce this short-latency increase in /low  ac-
tivity (Figs. 3B, 4). Post hoc analyses confirmed that this early
response was only induced by T1 in T2-unseen trials (t(6) 2.75,
p 0.055), not in T2-seen trials (t(6) 0.55, p 0.59). This effect
was not observed for the right ventral striatum.
Second, conscious T2 perceptionwas associatedwith an increase
in  (4–8Hz) oscillatory activity between150 and 400ms in both
the left and right ventral striatum (Fig. 3). For the left ventral stria-
tum, it can clearly be seen that when both targets were consciously
perceived (T2-seen trials), this increase in  activity was observed
between 200 and 400ms after each target onset (Fig. 4B). However,
whenonlyT1was seen (T2-unseen trials), only the first increase in 
activity was present (Fig. 4A). Of further note, when T2 followed T1
aftera long interval, the second increase inactivitywascorrespond-
ingly shifted in time (Fig. 4C), confirming that the second increase in
 power observed in short-interval T2-seen trials is related to (con-
scious) T2 processing. The difference in T2-induced  power be-
tweenT2-seen andT2-unseen trialswas significant between215 and
400ms post-T2 in the left ventral striatumandbetween 150 and 280
ms in the right ventral striatum (Fig. 3). Post hoc analyses confirmed
that the  response to T2was only significantly increased frombase-
line in the left ventral striatum in trials in which T2 was seen (t(6)
2.64,p0.05), andnot in trials inwhichT2wasnot seen(t(6)1.05,
p 0.33) (Fig. 3B). However, in the right ventral striatum, the in-
crease in activity toT2was not significantly different frombaseline
in T2-seen trials (t(6) 1.87, p 0.1), indicating that the effect was
less robust in the righthemisphere.Thus, only consciouslyperceived
T2’s were signaled by  oscillatory activity in the ventral striatum.
This effect was also visible at the two most dorsal contact points (3
and 4) in the left ventral ALIC (data not shown).
Last, conscious T2 perception was associated with a greater
increase in -band (15–30 Hz) activity in T2-seen versus T2-
unseen trials between 210 and 260ms after T2 in the right ventral
striatum (Fig. 3). This  increase was not significantly increased
from baseline in either condition (T2-seen trials: t(6) 1.84, p
0.2; T2-unseen trials: t(6) 0.18. p 0.86; Figs. 3B, 4).
Thus, the AB was associated with differences in both T1 and
T2 processing; T1 processing influenced the ability to consciously
perceive T2, as indicated both by stronger/ activity between 80
and 140 ms after T1 in the left ventral striatum. Moreover, only
perceived T2’s elicited a  response between 150–280 ms in the
right ventral striatum and 200–400 ms in the left ventral stria-
tum, and a transient increase in  activity between 210 and 260
ms in the right ventral striatum.
As T1 could have one of two colors (red or green), we ran a
control analysis to ensure that observed differences inT1process-
ing between T2-seen and T2-unseen trials could not be ac-
counted for by differences in the relative contribution of red T1
versus green T1 trials between trial types. Specifically, we ran an
additional repeated-measures ANOVA with T1 color and inter-
val (short vs long) as within-subject variables. This analysis im-
portantly showed that T2 detection was not affected by T1 color
(nomain effect of T1 color: F(1,6) 0.012; p 0.915), nor was AB
size (no interaction between T1 color and Interval: F(1,6) 0.336;
p 0.583), excluding this possibility.
Discussion
This study aimed to shed more light on the role of the ventral
striatum in conscious perception. We found that conscious T2
perception was not only reflected in, but also influenced by, ven-
tral striatal activity in that responses to T1 foreshadowed the AB
to T2. Specifically, only in T2-unseen trials, T1 elicited a short-
latency (80–140ms) increase in and lower activity (8–16Hz)
in the left ventral striatum. This novel finding suggests that the
AB to T2 is determined by T1 processing at a much earlier pro-
cessing stage than commonly assumed (Dux and Marois, 2009;
Martens and Wyble, 2010). Our second main finding was that
only consciously perceived T2s were associated with an increase
in  activity between 215–400ms and 150–280ms in the left and
right ventral striatum, respectively, as well as with transient
-band activity between 210 and 260 ms in the right ventral
striatum. Thus, we also observed signals related to conscious ex-
perience in the ventral striatum before, or in the time range in
which the global network of frontoparietal regions implicated in
consciousness is activated (Sergent et al., 2005; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011). Together, these findings suggest that the ven-
tral striatummay contribute to conscious perception andprovide
first insight into the time course of its contributions. They may
also shed novel light on the mechanisms that give rise to one of
the most studied phenomena in the consciousness literature: the
attentional blink.
Strikingly, the AB was associated with differences in T1 pro-
cessing as early as 80 ms after T1 (i.e., much earlier than previ-
ously shown with scalp-EEG) (Sergent et al., 2005; Slagter et al.,
2007). Specifically, this work has shown that in trials in which T2
goes undetected, the T1-elicited P3b, a brain potential with a
latency of300–400 ms, is delayed or larger in amplitude (Ser-
gent et al., 2005; Slagter et al., 2007). As the P3b has been linked to
several, albeit related, cognitive functions, including working
memory updating (Donchin, 1981), event categorization (Kok,
2001), and decisionmaking (Twomey et al., 2015), these findings
have been taken as support for major AB theories that propose
that T1 encoding renders some mechanism unavailable for T2
processing until T1 encoding is completed and, thus, that the AB
is related to some later-stage information processing bottleneck
(Duncan et al., 1994; Chun and Potter, 1995; Bowman and
Wyble, 2007; for reviews, see Dux andMarois, 2009;Martens and
Wyble, 2010;Marti et al., 2015). Yet, our findings relate the AB to
differences in T1 processing starting at 80 ms. This could suggest
that T1 consolidation starts much earlier, as soon as sufficient
evidence has been collected. Alternatively, the ABmay be affected
by T1 processing at a much earlier processing stage. Notably,
animal work has shown that the ventral striatum responds to
salient stimuli within 100ms. This response is thought to reflect a
Figure 2. AB task performance. Percentage T1 accuracy (left) and percentage T2 accurate
given T1 correct (T2/T1) (right) are shown separately for short (200 ms) and long (800 ms)
T1–T2 interval trials, for eachpatient (lines) and at the group level (bars). As shown, a robust AB
was observed as reflected by lower T2/T1 accuracy in short interval comparedwith long interval
trials. Error bars indicate SEM.
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signal to frontal regions to orient attention to potentially relevant
information for further processing (Redgrave et al., 1999b; Hor-
vitz, 2000; Overton et al., 2014). Although this warrants further
research, the short-latency increase in / activity may thus re-
flect an early alerting signal triggered by a salient stimulus, the
strength of which determines the extent of higher-order stimulus
processing, and ability of the brain to pick up on a subsequently
presented target stimulus (Slagter et al., 2009). This possibility
receives initial support from a study in which early evoked activ-
ity (80–180 ms) in the nucleus accumbens related to deviancy
detection predicted the amplitude of the scalp P3b (Du¨rschmid et
al., 2016). Yet, future studies that manipulate, for example, T1
saliency are necessary to draw firm conclusions regarding the
functional significance of our early / effect.
Intriguingly, the short-latency difference in T1 processing was
observed in the ventral striatum. This raises the question how the
ventral striatum, which does not directly receive visual input, can in
some trials “know” so quickly after T1, which differed from the
distractors in color and shape/identity, that a salient stimulus has
been presented. Animal research shows that short-latency visual in-
Figure3. TheAB is predictedby, and reflected in, ventral striatal activity. Shownare intracranial EEGdata fromthe left and right ventral striatum.A, Time-frequency representations show z values
reflecting the strength of differences in striatal activity between T2-seen and T2-unseen short-interval trials. Time-frequency windowswhere the difference reached significance are highlighted in
black. Average power (in dB) within these significant windows is shown inB separately for T2-unseen and T2-seen trials. The ABwas associatedwith an early difference in T1-induced and low
activity (8–16) between 80 and 140ms after T1 in the left ventral striatum.Moreover, conscious T2 perceptionwas associatedwith an increase in activity (4– 8Hz) between 215 and 400ms after
T2 in the left ventral striatumandbetween 150 and 280ms after T2 in the right ventral striatum. Finally, in the right ventral striatum, perceived T2s elicited greater activity in the-band (15–30Hz)
activity between 210 and 260 ms after T2 than T2s that went undetected. Thus, the AB to T2 was foreshadowed by a short-latency response to T1 in the left ventral striatum, and conscious T2
perception was signaled by longer-latency ventral striatal activity in the  and bands.
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formation is provided by the superior colliculus to dopaminergic
neurons,which in turnproject to the striatum(Overton et al., 2014).
Yet, the superior colliculus is relatively primitive and allegedly not
capable of distinguishing between colors (McPeek andKeller, 2002)
or complex visual stimuli (Schiller andKoerner, 1971;Goldberg and
Wurtz, 1972), making it unlikely that the here observed short-
latency response reflects input from this region. At a slightly longer
latency (after150 ms), the ventral striatum can receive the results
Figure4. The failure to perceive T2 is foreshadowedby early (80–140ms) T1 processing in the ventral striatum, and conscious T2 target perception is associatedwith later (200–400ms) ventral
striatal activity. Shown are intracranial EEG data from the left (left figures) and right (right figures) ventral striatum. Time-frequency representations show oscillatory activity induced by T1 and T2
A, Short-interval T2-unseen B, short-interval T2-seen, and C, long-interval T2-seen trials. In trials in which T2 was not seen, T1 induced a strong increase in and low oscillatory activity (8–16)
between 80 and 140 ms after T1 in the left ventral striatum. Moreover, in the left ventral striatum, when T2 was consciously perceived, an increase in  oscillatory activity (4– 8 Hz) was observed
215–400 ms after each target onset. However, when only T1 was seen, only the first increase in  activity was present. Moreover, the second increase in  activity is shifted in time with the
presentation of T2 in long-interval trials, confirming that it is related to conscious perception of T2. Thus, only consciously perceived targets were signaled by oscillatory activity between 200 and
400ms, in particular, in the left ventral striatum. Finally, conscious T2 perception was associated with a transient increase in-band activity (15–30 Hz) in the right ventral striatum 210–260ms
after T2.
1086 • J. Neurosci., February 1, 2017 • 37(5):1081–1089 Slagter et al. • Ventral Striatum and Conscious Perception
of complex stimulus processing via a recently discovered route by
which cortical areas project to dopaminergic neurons via the supe-
rior colliculus (Overton et al., 2014). Yet, the / effect occurred
earlier. Although the ventral striatum also receives visual informa-
tion via the thalamus, this is primarily from higher-order thalamic
nuclei, which receive little direct sensory input. Therefore, our find-
ings,which indicatevery short-latency informationprocessing in the
ventral striatum dependent on nonspatial visual features, cannot
easily be explainedby existing ideas about subcortical visual process-
ing and warrant further research. Moreover, the fact that the early
/ effect was only triggered by T1 in T2-unseen trials further sug-
gests that it does not simply reflect sensory T1 processing. This ob-
servation also raises the question as to why a physically identical T1
only elicited this response inT2-unseen, but not T2-seen, trials. Sev-
eral studies have shown that differences in attentional state can in-
fluenceT1processingandABmagnitude(OliversandNieuwenhuis,
2005; Slagter et al., 2007; van Vugt and Slagter, 2014), raising the
possibility that trial-to-trial fluctuations in attentional state may
have contributed to observed effects. Notably,  and  oscillations
have been specifically related to top-down, feedback-related pro-
cessing (Bastos et al., 2015).Thus, although speculative, the extent to
which T1 captured attention or placed demands on consolidation
processes may have depended on pretarget attentional state. Alter-
natively, differences in bottom-up T1 strength across trials, caused
by variability across trials in the specific target-distracter sequence
and hence distractormasking,may have also influencedT1 process-
ing (Bowman and Wyble, 2007). Future studies that manipulate
attentional state andT1saliencyarenecessary todetermine the func-
tional significance of our early/ effect. Nevertheless, our findings
indicate that the AB is related to T1 processing at a much earlier
processing stage than is commonly assumed, at the subcortical level.
They may also extend recent findings that indicate that, although
visual consciousness and endogenous (top-down) attentionmay be
neurally dissociated (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Wyart and Tallon-
Baudry, 2008), exogenous spatial attention (Chica and Bartolomeo,
2012) and phasic alertness (Kusnir et al., 2011) are important ante-
cedents of conscious experience and facilitate conscious access by
calling upon frontoparietal networks to orient attention.
Importantly, striatal responses to T1 not only prevented con-
scious access to T2, conscious T2 perception was also signaled by
striatal activity in the  band. This is notable as most theories of
consciousness focus exclusively on the cortex and/or thalamocorti-
cal interactions (Rees et al., 2002;Haynes, 2009;Dehaene andChan-
geux, 2011; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Aru et al., 2012; van Gaal and
Lamme, 2012), and are agnostic on striatal contributions.  oscilla-
tions are associated with the active intake of sensory stimuli (Bastos
et al., 2015), but are also observed in structures further down the
processing stream, including the hippocampus (Colgin, 2013).
Hippocampal-generated  oscillations are key in setting the dynam-
ics formemory encoding and retrieval within cortical circuits (Has-
selmo and Stern, 2014). As the ventral striatum allegedly does not
generate  oscillations itself (van der Meer and Redish, 2011) and
intracranial EEG measures local field potentials (i.e., neuronal in-
put), the observed T2 detection-related  response may thus reflect
hippocampal-dependent processes. The nucleus accumbens, which
also receives inputs from the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and the
ventral tegmental area, projects to both the mediodorsal nucleus of
the thalamus and the thalamic nucleus reticularis, which in turn
project to the prefrontal cortex. The nucleus accumbens is thus well
positioned to integrate information fromdifferent sources andselect
which information is broadcasted through the brain (via the tha-
lamic nucleus reticularis) (Scheibel, 1980) or selected for sustained
cortical representation (via the mediodorsal nucleus of the thala-
mus) (GotoandGrace, 2008).This is significant as several influential
theories propose that consciousness is related to the “broadcasting”
of sensory information to the whole brain and that thalamocortical
circuits serve as an importantmediator of such broadcasting (New-
man and Baars, 1993; Crick, 1995; Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Baars, 2005;Dehaene andChangeux, 2005, 2011). Future studies are
necessary to determine how the striatum may precisely influence
thalamocortical interactions and conscious perception.
As for the T2 perception-related increase in activity, a recent
iEEG study reported reduced -band activity in the ventral stria-
tum at a similar latency to rare versus frequent scene images
(Zaehle et al., 2013), suggesting that -band activity may signal
contextual deviancy. Yet, we observed an increase in  activity to
perceived T2s. This discrepancy in findingsmight relate to differ-
ences in the specific task or reference procedure used.
Our results extend findings from neuroimaging studies
(Christensen et al., 2006; Slagter et al., 2010, 2012; Van Opstal et
al., 2014; Bisenius et al., 2015; Chica et al., 2016) by revealing the
time course of conscious perception-related striatal activity. Im-
portantly, some of these studies used simple backward masking
tasks with only one stimulus (Christensen et al., 2006; VanOpstal
et al., 2014; Bisenius et al., 2015), in which conscious access is not
dependent on attentional selection (Dehaene and Changeux,
2011) as in the AB task. Yet, many fMRI studies did not report
conscious-related activity in the striatum. Possibly, fMRI does
not provide a sensitive measure of consciousness-related activity
in the basal ganglia due to the nature of the BOLD response;
BOLD activity mostly reflects local field potential activity be-
tween 20 and 60Hz (Goense and Logothetis, 2008) and correlates
negatively with  power (Laufs et al., 2003; Scheeringa et al.,
2011). Low-frequency oscillatory activity, as observed here, may
hence not be reflected in increasedBOLDactivity or even result in
decreased BOLD activity. Combined with the fact that basal gan-
glia activity cannot be measured with scalp-EEG (Cohen et al.,
2011), this might explain the exclusion of a striatal contribution
in many theories of consciousness. Yet, the striatum is well posi-
tioned to gate cortical information flow and integrate the mas-
sively parallel and distributed information capacity of the
cerebral cortex into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of op-
eration required to form a coherent percept of our environment.
Albeit speculative, our observations may provide initial support
for this idea.
A role for striatum-dependent gating mechanisms in the AB fits
with influential theories that attribute theAB todysfunctional gating
of information (Di Lollo et al., 2005; Bowman and Wyble, 2007;
Olivers andMeeter, 2008). For example, in the episodic simultane-
ous type serial tokenmodel (Bowman andWyble, 2007), target per-
ception critically relies on the capacity to rapidly detect that a
stimulus is salient when a fleeting representation of it arises among
(temporally) competing stimuli, and the ability to sustain this rep-
resentation through transient attentional enhancement formemory
encoding. In this model, ongoing consolidation of T1 has an inhib-
itory effect on T2 attentional selection, resulting in impaired T2 de-
tection. According to another influential theory (Olivers and
Meeter, 2008), the AB reflects the workings of a rapidly responding
gating system. Specifically, T1 elicits transient excitatory feedback
activity within 100msmeant to provide access to workingmemory.
However, accidentally, the subsequent post-T1 distracter is
“boosted,” resulting in a strong inhibitory feedback response, which
closes the gate to workingmemory for T2. This theory actually pos-
tulated a possible role for the basal ganglia in the AB.
Although behaviorally ourmixed-patient data are very similar
to typical findings in healthy adults, the question remains how
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our findings translate to the healthy human brain. Answering this
question requires the development ofmethods that can noninva-
sively measure subcortical activity with high temporal precision
in healthy humans.
In conclusion, our results shed new light on the mechanisms
that give rise to the AB, by revealing that the AB may be due to
very early T1-driven attentional capture. More generally, by
showing that conscious perception is modulated by ventral stri-
atal activity, they suggest that the neural mechanisms underlying
conscious access may not be confined to the thalamocortical
complex alone.
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